Assumptions
Each agent can act autonomously. Each agent has its own information about the world. Each agent can have its own utility function. A mechanism specifies how the actions of the agents lead to outcomes, e.g., rules of chess. A rational agent acts strategically; its actions are based on utility. Nature can be defined as an agent with no utility and no strategy.
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Definitions
Agents can be fully cooperative; they share the same utility. Agents can be fully competitive; they have the opposite utility. In a zero-sum game, the sum of the utilities for the agents is zero for every outcome.
Game theory studies what agents should do in a multi-agent setting. 
Normal Form of a Game
The strategic form or normal form of a game contains:
a finite set I of agents, {1, . . . , n}. a set of strategies for each agent. A strategy profile s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) means that agent i follows strategy s i . utility functions u i (s) gives the expected utility for agent i when all agents follow strategy profile s. An outcome is produced when all the agents follow a strategy profile.
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Simple Example: Rock-Paper-Scissors
In the game of rock-paper-scissors, there are two agents, each choosing one of three actions {rock,paper, scissors}. For each combinations of actions, a payoff matrix can be used to specify the utilities.
Agent 2 rock paper scissors rock 0, 0 −1, 1 1, −1 Agent 1 paper
Extensive Form of a Game
The extensive form of a game or a game tree is a finite tree where the nodes are states and the edges are actions. Each internal node is controlled by an particular agent. Each edge out of a node controlled by agent i corresponds to an action for agent i. Each node controlled by nature has a probability distribution over its children.
The leaves represent final outcomes and are labeled with a utility for each agent.
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Perfect Information Example
Imperfect Information Example
An agent cannot distinguish the nodes in an information set.
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Multiagent Decision Networks
A multiagent decision network is a factored representation of a multiagent decision problem. Each decision node is labeled with an agent that makes the decision for the node. Each agent has a utility node. As with a decision network, the parents of a decision node are the information for making the decision.
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Example Multiagent Decision Network
The scenario is that two roommates each might have a test to study for, choosing then to study or cook some food for both of them to eat.
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Two-Agent Zero-Sum Games 11
Two-Agent Zero-Sum Games
A two-agent zero-sum game is when a positive reward for one agent is an equally negative reward for the other agent. The utility can be characterized by a single number that one agent is trying to maximize and the other agent is trying to minimize. Having a single value for a two-agent zero-sum game leads to a minimax strategy. Each node is either a MAX node, if controlled by the maximizing agent, or a MIN node if controlled by the minimizing agent. Treat agent currently in control (whose turn it is to move) as MAX.
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Minimax Procedure
Procedure Minimax(N ) Inputs: a node in a game tree if N is a leaf node, then
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Evaluation Functions
The game tree of many games is too large to search. An alternative is:
Search as deeply as possible given time requirement.
Use an evaluation function to estimate the values of nodes at the fringe. Use minimax to combine the values into an overall evaluation.
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Idea of Alpha-Beta Pruning
Alpha-beta pruning avoids search that won't change the minimax evaluation. Example: If MAX has a move with value 3, stop searching other moves known to be ≤ 3. General Principle: Consider a node N . 
Alpha-Beta Procedure with Eval Function
Procedure Alpha-Beta (N, d, f, α, β) if N is a leaf node, then return value of N else if d = 0, then return f (N ) 
Depends on a good ordering of children. Actual programs approach the minimum bound. Alpha-beta pruning allows programs to look ahead nearly twice as many moves as minimax.
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Other Issues Nash Equilibriums s i is a best response to s −i if for all other strategies s ′ i for agent i: utility(s i s −i , i) ≥ utility(s ′ i s −i , i) A strategy profile s is a Nash equilibrium if, for each agent i, strategy s i is a best response to s −i . A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile such that no agent can be better by changing its strategy. Theorem [Nash, 1950] Every finite game has at least one Nash equilibrium. In the soccer example, p k = 0.4 and p j = 0.3 is a Nash equilibrium. 
Prisoners' Dilemma
Two prisoners for a crime can either stay silent or talk, providing evidence against the other prisoner. The payoff is the number of years in prison.
Prisoner 2 silent talk Prisoner 1 silent −1, −1 −3, 0 talk 0, 3 −2, −2 CS 3793/5233 Artificial Intelligence Multiple Agents -27
Tragedy of the Commons
There are 100 agents.
There is a common environment shared by the agents. Each agent can choose do nothing with a 0 payoff, or do a selfish action that has a +10 payoff for the agent but includes a −1 payoff for all the other agents. If only one agent does a selfish action, that agent has a +9 payoff. If every agent does a selfish action, each agent gets a −90 payoff.
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Computing Nash Equilibria
To compute Nash equilibria:
Eliminate dominated strategies. Determine which actions will have non-zero probabilities. This is the support set. Determine the probability for the actions in the support set.
Agent 2 x y z a 3, 5 5, 1 1, 2 Agent 1 b 1, 1 2, 9 6, 4 c 2, 6 4, 7 0, 8 CS 3793/5233 Artificial Intelligence Multiple Agents -29
